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ABSTRACT
In the aftermath of the wars in the former Yugoslavia, feminist
activists have encouraged the use of international law to prosecute
those leaders employing rape as a tool for ethnic cleansing. First,
we will analyze the reasons that rape is effective in disrupting social
and familiar structures in particular contexts.  In the absence of
patriarchy, we suggest, rape loses its distinctiveness as a weapon
against women.  Second, we will elucidate the peculiar problems of
prosecuting war criminals whose offenses targeted female non-com-
batants in the form of sexual violence.  We begin with an examina-
tion of the international law related to war crimes, as well as the
ethical implications of various techniques used to enforce the law
and bring war criminals to justice.  A brief examination of key areas
of US rape law will demonstrate the relative leniency extended to
perpetrators of violence against women domestically in a nation
that guarantees women full juridical equality.  After examining
some specific prosecutions, we will apply the lessons learned to the
larger context of international law. 
INTRODUCTION
When stories regarding the atrocities committed at rape camps in the for-
mer Yugoslavia began to surface in the nineties, they were met with universal hor-
ror and condemnation. The US Department of State responded to the Balkan hor-
rors in early 1992 by characterizing the rapes as a “war crime,” worthy of prose-
cution under international law and the Geneva Conventions.1 Both non-govern-
mental organizations and state actors deemed sexual victimization of women,
whether as a privilege of conquest or as an instrument of terror, as unacceptable.
Yet, while condemning the actions of the military men in the former Yugoslavia,
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the international community ignored both the long history of rape in the context
of war, as well as the sexual abuse of women that routinely occurs in most soci-
eties independent of armed conflict. In doing so, these governments and interna-
tional organizations tacitly condone rape.
Nonetheless, the willingness to decry practices at the rape camps marks a
progressive step in how the international community responds to such widespread
violation of women’s bodies and psyches. Furthermore, the international disap-
probation gives rise to a need for an in-depth analysis of the relationship between
the legal treatment of rape in peacetime and the prosecution of sexual violence
that occurs in the context of war.  Specifically, there is a compelling need to deter-
mine if the international condemnation of mass rapes in the former Yugoslavia
represents a shift in the dominant paradigm that normalizes and minimizes men’s
use of sexuality to reinforce their dominance over women. Alternatively, some
other element or characteristic peculiar to the Yugoslavia war crimes might
explain the attention given to the violation of women’s human rights in this con-
text.  Unfortunately, the apparent progress represented by criminal convictions of
those organizing mass rapes is illusory. The prosecution of the mass rapes does
not reflect an intolerance of rape as an offense against women, but rather it signi-
fies intolerance of rape used particularly as a tool for ethnic cleansing, or rape
perpetrated systematically to humiliate a male enemy. While the creation of a tri-
bunal and incorporation of rape into existing definitions of genocide and torture
are seemingly feminist actions, in truth they do not represent a reconceptualiza-
tion of men’s sexual rights over women.
The sexual appropriation of women’s bodies, both in wartime and in
peacetime, reflects a universal sense of patriarchal entitlement to the use and
abuse of women’s bodies. This attitude extends to the implicit exclusion of vio-
lence perpetrated against women as women from the definitions of human rights
violations. Underlying the absence of stronger, legally defined, international con-
demnation and action is a fundamental lack of concern for women as humans, as
women, who are physically, psychologically, spiritually, and otherwise injured by
the violence of rape. Compare, for example, the language contained in interna-
tional conventions on the elimination of racism and sexism.  The preamble to the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination begins, “convinced that any doctrine of superiority based on racial
differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and
dangerous and that there is no justification for racial discrimination, in theory or
in practice . . ..”2 This rhetoric condemns racism on four powerful, distinctly
unique grounds. In contrast, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women reads, “recalling that discrimination against
women violates the principles of equality of rights and respect for human digni-
ty . . . hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the family and makes
more difficult the full development of the potentialities of women in the service
of their countries and of humanity . . ..”3 This view focuses upon harms to the
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community, in general, and invokes women principally in their social role as 
nurturers.
In short, the UN, speaking for the international community, declared that
racism should be eliminated because it is immoral.  Sexism, however, merely
hampers “equality” and “dignity,” and should be eliminated to encourage
women’s contribution to society.  The denial of rights to women as women, while
irrational and unfortunate, is not “morally condemnable.”  It should come as no
surprise, then, that punishing violations of women’s rights is a relatively low pri-
ority.  This is not a novel claim given the vast literature on the acceptance of rape
in Western culture.4
Beginning with the Bosnian conflict, the international community began to
condemn rape in the context of war, distinguishing it from the normal, everyday
rapes that occur in times of peace.  As reports of rape camps and first-hand
accounts of those experiences emerged, rape, when perpetrated in an organized
fashion and sanctioned by military commanders, ceased to be an unfortunate con-
comitant of war and became a war crime worthy of condemnation and prosecu-
tion.  To that end, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) was charged with the task of prosecuting those responsible for mass
rapes, using the conventional legal techniques applied generally.  
However, conventional legal practices ignore the connection between
domestic legal structures that effectively fail to distinguish between rape and sex,
thus replicating the challenges that accompany the prosecution of rape using
Anglo-American legal practices. The ready acceptance of rape as a “normal” part
of life in most nations necessarily affects the ability of international tribunals to
redress the crimes committed by rapists in the context of war.  The policies the
United States uses to define a crime worthy of punishment by the criminal law
express the fundamental values that are brought to bear in its advocacy for redress
of war crimes abroad. A discussion of the legal treatment of sexual violence
against women in the United States will elucidate this connection and the impli-
cations thereof.
NORMALIZED RAPE IN PEACETIME
Certainly, the United States is not the only nation participating in the
development of international law, nor is it the most liberal in its domestic treat-
ment of women.  Other nations provide broader protection to women and allow
for much greater reproductive autonomy.  However, as the world’s only remain-
ing superpower, the United States exerts extraordinary influence upon the forma-
tion and enforcement of international law and practices.  It pays lip service to
human rights, yet uses violations of human rights as a justification for military
interventions.  Another reason to focus on the limitations of the law within the
United States relates to the role of individualist norms in shaping the law and
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masking its gendered nature.  Criminal trials, as conceived in Anglo-American
law and in war crimes tribunals, are adversarial situations involving an accused
individual and the society or community against which s/he has transgressed.
The victim, while brought to testify, is neither a party to the case nor an individ-
ual whose rights must be protected.  Once the trial begins, the rights of the
accused become paramount.  
A key norm in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the presumption of inno-
cence, embodies the privileging of the accused and his or her version of events.
The presumption requires the court to favor the account of the accused, while
regarding that of the victim with skepticism.  The prosecution does not represent
the victim, but represents the society as a whole.  As such, a system is created in
which individual rights dominate, but the victim’s role is to be a living, breathing
piece of evidence.  She is not an individual and thus lacks rights.  The focus on
the individual provides protection to the accused, but also requires the court to
scrutinize a particular set of facts involving a defendant and the evidence against
him.  This approach focuses on the particular rather than the general. Thus, larg-
er patterns of dominance and submission are sublimated and, because they are not
made manifest, they are ignored. The indifference of the authorities can exacer-
bate the victim’s suffering, by further marginalizing her and minimizing the sig-
nificance of her experience and trauma.5 Because the law fails to recognize the
perspective of the subordinate (indeed, the law characterizes the accused as the
weaker party, facing the might of the state), it instead applies the perspective of
the dominant.  Therefore, individualism and patriarchy intertwine in a manner
that becomes apparent only when the crime cannot be distinguished from the nor-
mal pattern of domination and subordination.  Such is the situation with rape law.  
When the evidentiary practices and institutional norms of Anglo-American
jurisprudences are transferred to the international sphere in the enabling statutes
for war crimes tribunals, those same biases and difficulties transfer as well.  They
are embedded in the law itself.  For this reason, a full understanding of the chal-
lenges inherent in prosecuting rape in war requires an elucidation of the problems
of prosecuting rape in peace.  The United States is a useful comparator, not only
as a result of the substantial feminist literature examining its rape law, but also
because its powerful constitutional commitment to individual rights illustrates the
ways in which a focus on the individual disguises the operation of patriarchy.  
Violence against women is so difficult to redress because it occurs routine-
ly and is thus normalized. It is important to recognize that mass rapes occur out-
side of the context of war and not infrequently.  Scandals regarding the behavior
of fraternities and athletic teams abound.  The relationship between organizations
promoting hypermasculinity (teams, fraternities, the military) and the acceptance
of sexually coercive behavior is well established.6 As anthropologist Peggy
Reeves Sanday explains, the gang rape that occurs when fraternity men decide to
“run a train” on an inebriated party-goer reflects a need to display power and
dominance – the same need that predisposes men to rape in the context of war.7
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Through a phallocentric ritual of dominance, a group of men asserts its superior-
ity over women and the men to whom those women “belong.” Yet, the domestic
variation of gang rape is seldom prosecuted, dismissed as the thoughtless acts of
drunken men presented with an opportunity for sex with a foolish, and possibly
unconscious, young woman.8 If these rapes are dismissed as lapses in judgment,
the message is that rape during wartime is taken seriously only when perpetrated
by the men on the losing side of a conflict and when perpetrated with a genoci-
dal purpose.  To seek redress, women must appeal to yet another group of men,
given the overwhelmingly male composition of the ICTY tribunals.
Unfortunately, the new recognition of rape as an act of institutionalized violence
does not reflect a fundamental change in the status of women.  It simply indicates
that this particular group of men, combatants in the former Yugoslavia, went
beyond the limits of “normal” rape.
Rape is a uniquely complex crime in that its very criminality is determined
not by the act itself, but by the perpetrator’s asserted perception of the victim’s
intentions.  That is, instead of determining whether or not the defendant commit-
ted an act, courts must determine whether the defendant believed that the victim
agreed to participate in a sexual act.  Under the common law, courts would assess
the victim’s willingness not by her testimony but by how effectively she conveyed
her unwillingness to the accused.9 The court might inquire as to whether she resis-
ted fiercely enough to leave marks on the accused, whether she reported the crime
promptly, and whether she had a history of promiscuity. As Catharine MacKinnon
notes, “rape is a sex crime that is not regarded as a crime when it looks like sex .
. ..  The level of acceptable force is adjudicated starting just above the level set by
what is seen as normal male sexual behavior . . . rather than at the victim’s, or
women’s point of violation.”10 The defense, then, is consent, and all of the
resources of a defendant in a rape case focus upon proving that the victim is being
dishonest or disingenuous – that she did, indeed, consent.   In short, the defense
must destroy the credibility of the victim to win the case.  
A wave of reform efforts in the eighties, precipitated by feminist criticisms
of existing law, appeared to offer new protections to victims. The changes recog-
nized the shortcomings of common law approaches to rape and enacted statutes
altering the legal standards. Many states’ statutes softened the common law stan-
dard of “utmost resistance.” For example, the Delaware statute requires “reason-
able resistance under the circumstances to communicate nonconsent,” Idaho
allows for resistance “overcome by force or violence,” and Louisiana law pro-
vides that forcible rape requires “force or threats of physical violence that make
resistance useless.”11 Other states, including Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New
Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Virginia eliminated the resistance
requirement altogether.12 Despite the best efforts of legislatures, many judges con-
tinued to apply common law resistance requirements in rape cases.13 Thus, a vic-
tim can expect to testify about how much resistance she offered, why she failed
to offer more resistance, how she came to be with the defendant, when and why
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she reported the assault, and the like.  Even if the victim’s judgment was impec-
cable, she must re-live the assault through questioning; therefore, she may appear
emotional and irrational during testimony.  This behavior, too, can affect percep-
tions of her credibility.  Because reporting a rape may well subject a victim to a
process that requires her to respond to questions and thus review the assault
repeatedly, many victims choose to remain silent. 
Rape shield laws represent another legislative effort to secure legal protec-
tion for victims, preventing defense counsel from gratuitously eliciting testimony
regarding the victim’s prior sexual behavior. State statutes shielding the victim’s
sexual history from scrutiny take a variety of forms. Some admit all relevant tes-
timony, some require a hearing prior to the introduction of testimony about the
victim’s sexual past, others limit the use of such evidence to a very few, specifi-
cally defined circumstances.14 However, even the most restrictive jurisdictions
continue to allow evidence of the victim’s sexual activities if there is doubt
regarding the source of the physical evidence (usually semen) or if the prior
behavior involved the defendant and is offered to show consent.15 New York
admits the victim’s prostitution convictions, suggesting that the victim’s willing-
ness to sell sexual access constitutes exculpatory evidence for the defendant.16
At the federal level, the law recognizes the following exceptions: 
evidence of specific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged vic-
tim offered to prove that a person other than the accused was the
source of semen, injury, or other physical evidence; evidence of spe-
cific instances of sexual behavior by the alleged victim with respect
to the person accused of the sexual misconduct offered by the
accused to prove consent or by the prosecution; and evidence the
exclusion of which would violate the constitutional rights of the
defendant.17
Such exceptions, considered necessary to protect the rights of the accused, signif-
icantly weaken protections extended to victims, as the same courts which contin-
ue to apply a common law resistance standard despite statutory revisions deter-
mine when it is appropriate to admit evidence of prior sexual history. The excep-
tions also give wide latitude to judges, who may incorporate their biases and per-
ceptions as they determine what is necessary to protect the rights of the defendant
under the third exception noted above.  
Both judges and jurors in rape trials may also include their biases and per-
ceptions in their decisions. Consider the following examples concerning the char-
acterizations of rape victims by judges and jurors who heard their testimony:
• A juror voted to acquit William Kennedy Smith of the rape of a woman
he picked up at a bar because “he’s too charming and too good-looking
to have to resort to violence for a night out”;
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• A judge referred to a 12-year-old victim as an “unusually promiscuous
young lady”;
• A juror voted to acquit three St. Johns University fraternity brothers of
a widely publicized gang rape on the assumption that “Hell hath no fury
like a woman scorned”;
• A judge voted to overturn a rape conviction on the theory that “when an
adult woman goes to a man’s room, [she certainly has] to realize that
they [are] not going upstairs to play Scrabble.”18
Therefore, despite the presence of rape shield laws, these examples epitomize the
way in which a patriarchy sexually objectifies women.
Because many rape victims believe they will be blamed for their own rapes
or considered “dirty” or promiscuous, experts believe that the reported rates sig-
nificantly underestimate the actual rates.  In addition, forms of sexual assault that
do not involve penetration of the vagina are frequently classified as distinct (and
lesser) offenses19 and in ways that excluded marital and acquaintance rape.20
Quite simply, rape is common and underreported in the United States. In fact, the
US holds the dubious distinction of having the highest rate of reported rape in the
industrialized world.  One in six women and one in thirty-three men have experi-
enced sexual assault.21
The underlying acceptance of rape in the domestic context, combined with
the law’s tendency to question, blame, or dismiss the victim, increases the chal-
lenges associated with bringing war criminals to justice, precisely because those
challenges are institutionalized in legal procedure and evidentiary rules.  Bringing
war criminals to justice is inseparable from the legal requirements for prosecut-
ing a rape and from the defenses permitted by law in any country, including the
United States.  The law encourages, even mandates, a thorough consideration of
the possibility that the victim welcomed the crime.
Feminist activists are increasingly disenchanted with legal reform, identi-
fying limitations of legal discourse focused upon the masculinized individual, as
described at the beginning of this section.  Nivedita Menon identifies multiple
lines of argument that intertwine in feminist discourse regarding the law.  Three
are relevant in the context of juridical equality.  First, the law extends full rights
to women only when they assimilate to male norms; that is, when they do not
behave in distinctly gendered ways.  Second, the law fails to recognize the exist-
ing, powerful differential by treating men and women as “similarly situated”
when they are not.  Third, the law favors objectivity over subjectivity, which ren-
ders women’s subjective suffering invisible.22 The last point elucidates the funda-
mental problem with rape jurisprudence as it is currently constructed.  Its insis-
tence on an objective assessment of whether the victim was sufficiently clear in
communicating her lack of consent renders her experience irrelevant.  The only
subjectivity acknowledged is that of the accused; the court assesses the reason-
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ableness of his perceptions as well.  Yet, the accused has the advantageous pre-
sumption of innocence and the concomitant constitutional protections.  The effect
of the presumption in favor of the accused is an equivalent presumption against
the veracity of the victim. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WAR CRIMES
In most UN member nations, women are raped on a daily basis and thus
victimized by men who are otherwise respected members of the community.23
Despite the assertion that women do enjoy full juridical equality in the United
States and should enjoy it everywhere, an ally’s treatment of its female popula-
tion is not a major consideration in foreign policy.24 The gendered biases of our
own laws devalue women and minimize the significance of abuses against them.
This bias is mirrored in our foreign policy and in our understanding of human
rights (and violations thereof) in international conflicts.  For violence against
women to be taken seriously, it must be horrific, and traceable to causes other
than “simple” sex discrimination.  
International law does not develop in a vacuum.  While the United Nations
is the closest approximation of “world government” that exists, it falls far short
of that description.  Participation in the United Nations is voluntary and the UN
Charter, its conventions and regulations, are binding only upon those parties that
agree to be bound.  Thus, international law is the law of compromise – positions
negotiated among diverse nations to reflect values acceptable to all.  Nations may
sign conventions yet “opt out” of offensive provisions, exercising the internation-
al version of a line-item veto.  Thus, although a nation may agree to the principle
of the “elimination of all forms of discrimination against women,” it may also
reject portions of the convention that conflict with existing legislation, the reli-
gious principles supported by the current government, or provisions deemed
“impractical” or inconvenient.  
Nations choose the “rights” they wish to honor when becoming signatories
to a human rights convention.  Those choices reflect the values embedded in their
domestic legislation and their willingness to devote resources to eliminating sex
discrimination.  If domestic law reflects a willingness to accept both discrimina-
tion and violence against women as natural and inevitable, international law will
reflect such attitudes. In particular, we might expect that “problem” nations, those
with appalling human rights records, will have domestic laws that fail to shield
women.  However, that is not the case.  Even those nations that espouse liberal
values of equality fail to extend full protection to women; their laws demonstrate
a willingness to accept rape as the unfortunate lot of women. Again, the gendered
dimensions of the law create obstacles for women seeking relief.  Practices that
specifically target women, especially rape, are sufficiently common in peacetime
contexts that most nations shrink from recognizing them as human rights viola-
tions.  This reluctance extends to attitudes toward those same acts committed in
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the context of armed conflict.   The international community is willing to con-
demn rape as a war crime in two contexts only: first, when it reaches the level of
genocide by targeting women of a particular religion, race, or ethnicity; and sec-
ond, when it seeks to humiliate men by abusing their women. This perspective
regards rape during wartime in male oriented terms: to be a violation, it must be
a horror that men can imagine or a crime perpetrated against women because of
some characteristic that they share with men.
Perhaps this masculine vision of moral wrongdoing reflects an ethical code
of conduct that, in theory, governs immoral military behavior. Thus, at least with
respect to war, the international community does not agree with the well-worn
phrase “all is fair in love and war.” There exists a body of international law – the
law of war – whose purpose is to minimize excessive brutality during armed con-
flicts. The law of war is designed to protect both combatants and noncombatants:
it regulates the conduct of hostilities, sets standards for the treatment of prisoners
of war, protects combatants removed from active participation in the conflict
through sickness and injury, and sanctifies the important distinction between the
treatment of combatants and noncombatants.25 Of course, through the ages the
regulations concerning war routinely have been violated – prisoners of war have
been tortured and killed, entire villages plundered, civilians killed or enslaved,
and entire ethnicities “cleansed.” 
Rape, too, is endemic to warfare. In World War I, German soldiers march-
ing into Belgium and France used rape and other atrocities to terrorize the local
populations.26 During World War II, rape was widespread in both the European
and Asian theaters of war.27 As that war came to a close, the Soviets, upon liber-
ating Berlin, reportedly raped between 110,000 and 900,000 German women.28
During the war that followed East Pakistan’s declaration of independence and its
founding as the new state of Bangladesh, at least 200,000 Bengali women were
raped by soldiers from West Pakistan in a deliberate campaign of terror and intim-
idation.29 Sadly, the list goes on: rape also occurred on a massive scale during
armed conflicts in Uganda, Myanmar, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kashmir, Peru, the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (a situation that still exists), East Timor,
Kuwait, Liberia, El Salvador, and Guatemala.30 Despite this record, however, it
was not until near the end of the twentieth century, following the events in the for-
mer Yugoslavia, that wartime rape was prosecuted as an international crime. It is
truly striking how little attention is given to the subject of sexual violence during
armed conflict. Kelly Askin’s work is especially informative in this regard. She
notes:
• In the entirety of the Hague Conventions, one single article (IV, art. 46)
vaguely and indirectly prohibits sexual violence as a violation of “fami-
ly honour”;
• The 42-volume set of transcripts of the Nuremberg Trial contains a 732
page index. Neither “rape,” nor “prostitution,” nor even “women” is
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included in headings or subheadings in this index, although crimes of
sexual violence are extensively documented in the transcripts;
• The five indexes added to the 22-volume set documenting the Tokyo
Trial, include “rape” under the subarticle of “atrocities,” which might be
supportable if afforded representative treatment. Yet, while the
[International Tribunal for the Far East] documents include numerous
accounts of rape and other forms of sexual violence, only a mere four
references are cited briefly;
• The Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials documented extensive
reports of sexual violence. Still, in the entirety of the four 1949 Geneva
Conventions, comprising a total of 429 articles, only one sentence of one
article (IV, art. 27) explicitly prohibits “rape” and “enforced prostitu-
tion,” and only a handful of other provisions indirectly prohibit crimes
of sexual violence;
• The 1974 Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in
Emergency and Armed Conflicts omits any reference to sexual violence;
• In the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions, which
were intended to supplement and clarify the 1949 Conventions, only one
sentence in each explicitly protects against sexual violence (Protocol I,
art. 76; Protocol II, art. 4).31
The invisibility of gender-specific crimes within the domestic/national legal
sphere, in addition to the fact that war is traditionally the business of men, con-
tributes to the lack of attention given to the perpetrating and prosecution of gen-
der-based crimes within the laws of war.
THE RAPE OF BOSNIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
In the early 1990s, the former state of Yugoslavia began to dissolve and a
devastating, brutal civil war started.  As early as June 1992, refugees fleeing from
Bosnia-Herzegovina to Croatia reported mass rapes resulting from the armed
conflict. In August 1992, an American journalist writing for Newsday compiled
the first complete report concerning the rape of Muslim women by Serb forces.32
The mass rapes and other sexual assaults continued throughout the war, with as
many as 50,000 women victimized. The rapes in Bosnia do not fall into the cate-
gory of “random rapes,” but were part of a systematic policy of ethnic cleansing.
Many of the attackers claim they were ordered to rape as part of a deliberate pol-
icy to ensure that the victims and their families would not want to return to a geo-
graphic area.33
What is the etiology of the mass rapes during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia (or any armed conflict)? The answer is patriarchal desire for domi-
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nance. Claudia Card, building upon the work of Catharine MacKinnon, contends
“if there is one set of fundamental functions of rape, civilian or martial, it is to
display, communicate, and produce or maintain dominance . . .. Rape is a cross-
cultural language of male domination (that is, domination by males; it can also be
domination of males)” [emphasis in the original].34 In this regard, part of a man’s
masculine self-image is based on power and domination over his world and over
the others around him. Thus, rape is a tool of domination in both the domestic
context and in the context of armed conflict. A man dominates the women of the
enemy by raping them and simultaneously dominates the enemy male by raping,
hurting, and humiliating the enemy’s prized possession, his women, whom the
enemy has sworn to protect. The enemy’s masculine self-image partially depends
upon this protection. Destruction of that part of an enemy’s masculine self-image
only enhances one’s own masculine self-image, making it more powerful and
thus, more masculine. 
Perceptions of both masculinity and femininity impact rape when used as
a weapon of war.  Ruth Seifert offers several explanations of the role of rape in
warfare.  The essence of her claim is that rape – in war and in peace – constitutes
a manifestation of hypermasculinity and hatred of the feminine.35 For example,
she argues that rapes are part of the “rules” of war: evidence suggests that rape is
endemic to armed conflict. War can be viewed as a “game,” with its own rituals
and regulations: “when looking back through history we find much to suggest that
within this ritual one rule of the game has always been that violence against
women in the conquered territory is conceded to the victor during the immediate
postwar period.”36 To the victors go the spoils. As Cynthia Enloe notes, 
“ ‘Murder, pillage and rape’ is a litany that has been repeated over and over by
war reporters as if rape naturally accompanied pillaging.”37 Women who endure
mass rapes lose all agency when their victimization becomes appropriated by the
males as subjects perceived only in masculine terms. As a result, “the rapes have
been reported as violations of ‘our’ women’s honor, as threats to ‘our’ manhood
as fathers, husbands and sons, challenges to ‘our’ collective masculinized honor
as an ethnic community, as a nation.”38 It is not simply the fact that a woman has
been violated that is significant.  It is the fact that a woman has been violated
repeatedly, and in a way that has cultural meaning, that is significant.  Had the
women in question been victimized by one or two soldiers, then killed or left
alone, it is doubtful that any further action would be taken, even if large numbers
of women were assaulted.  The scale must be extraordinary and the rapes must
serve a purpose that has significance for the men of the victimized community.
In genocidal rape, the tools of male dominance are employed against an entire
population, effectively feminizing the men of the targeted ethnic or cultural
group.39 At that point, as MacKinnon said, rapes become readily distinguishable
from sex. 
Moreover, once again, rape in warfare echoes rape in the domestic context.
This explanation of rape is reminiscent of Sanday’s accounts of rapes perpetrat-
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ed by fraternities.  The rape is a ritual, serving functions that have little to do with
the victims themselves, except insofar as the victims represent the feminine and
are the antithesis of all that the men involved aspire to be.  In war as in peace, rape
allows men to prove their power and to distinguish themselves from the weakness
and passivity associated with women.  The possession and dominance of the fem-
inine defines and reinforces the masculine.  
Responding to the on-going tragedies in the former Yugoslavia, in 1992 the
UN General Assembly passed Resolution 47/121 urging the Security Council to
establish an ad hoc tribunal for the prosecution of war crimes committed in
Bosnia.40 In 1993, the Security Council established the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia since 1991. During the creation of the ICTY
atrocities were still underway in the former Yugoslavia: rapes occurred as late as
1995, although most documented cases happened between the fall of 1991 and
the end of December 1993, with a concentration of rapes occurring between April
and November 1992.41
During the early negotiations about the creation of the ICTY, UN officials
were reluctant to address rape and other sexual violence because it was “very dif-
ficult to bring up these kinds of issues.”42 Nonetheless, pressure brought to bear
by a number of human rights and women’s rights groups, as well as the presence
of women (and several sympathetic men) as members of the tribunal, helped
ensure that rape allegations would be taken seriously.43 The prosecution of the
perpetrators in international criminal tribunals required the explicit inclusion of
rape as a crime against humanity.44
Even within the context of the extraordinarily brutal treatment the victims
endured in the rape camps, they must still undergo the trauma of trial.  They must
identify their assailants, endure questioning, and provide detailed accounts of
their victimization.  Although no one implies that the women sought these sexu-
al encounters in any way, many women are too ashamed to come forward: in the
former Yugoslavia, religious, cultural, and social factors made the problem of
investigating rape allegations even more intractable than usual. In a society in
which a woman's chastity is her honor, a woman may be unwilling to risk sham-
ing her husband or family by admitting that she was raped.45 Numerous factors,
then, in both the international and domestic contexts contribute to the victims’
apprehension to partake in a criminal trial.
In the context of domestic rape law, it is in the rules of evidence and pro-
cedure that we see the recreation of patriarchal dominance and the continued vic-
timization of the woman. Questions arise about her prior sexual conduct, the
veracity of her accusations, and the extent to which she actively resisted the
assault. Notably, it is exactly in this area – rules of evidence and procedure – that
we see modest “prosecutorial progress” in the ICTY concerning the rights and
protection of female victims. Earlier, we noted some of the problems associated
with prosecuting rape, where the “trials have been marked by the lack of female
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perspective in the courtroom and the application of a male standard.”46
Furthermore, Susan Edward notes, “it is in the rules of evidence and procedure
that we find the reproduction of the precipitating construction of female sexual
behavior that makes a charge of assault by the complainant difficult to sustain.”47
Feminist activists, applying the lessons gleaned from the failures of domestic rape
law, secured victim-friendly provisions in the rules governing the work of the
ICTY, of which Rule 96 is especially pertinent.48 In cases of sexual assault:
(i) no corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be required;
(ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defense if the victim
a. has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear vio-
lence, duress, detention, or psychological oppression, or
b. reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be
so subjected, threatened, or put in fear;
(iii) before evidence of the victim’s consent is admitted, the accused shall sat-
isfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credi-
ble; 
(iv) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted into evidence.49
Relative to the various state laws that govern US procedure, the specific
language of Rule 96 represents progress. The rules make the process less burden-
some for the victims, increasing the probability that women will cooperate.  Yet
the reforms neither acknowledge nor alter the patriarchal patterns that give impe-
tus to the rapes and are at best a modest improvement upon an unacceptable sta-
tus quo.  Because the rapes forwarded a genocidal purpose, a purpose that carries
meaning for men, the usual rules do not apply.
Still other procedural rules are relevant in cases of sexual assault because
they further protect the victim: first, the prosecutor may seek an order preventing
the disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness during the investigatory phase
of the proceedings (Rule 69); second, another rule (Rule 71) provides for some
evidence to be presented through a deposition, thus sparing victims and witness-
es the trouble of traveling to the Hague where the trials are being conducted; and
third, the tribunal may take measures during a trial to protect the privacy of vic-
tims and witnesses (Rule 75).50 Askin notes that these rules of evidence and pro-
cedure, especially Rule 96, are the “most progressive in the history of gender
jurisprudence, taking into account the coercive nature of rape.”51 In addition, the
tribunal demonstrated a willingness to hold those in authority responsible for
mass rapes, even if the prosecutors could not link a particular defendant to a par-
ticular victim. Indeed, the many specific rules of evidence and procedure in the
ICTY should be the basis of revision to similar rules in both domestic and inter-
national legal contexts, as they serve to mitigate the victim’s suffering during the
legal aftermath of rape.  Yet reforms that fail to recognize the patriarchal biases
embedded within legal institutions can accomplish only limited gains.
The case of Prosecutor v. Tadic [hereafter Tadic] was the first important
decision made by the ICTY that illustrates the potential of the above rules. Dusko
Tadic, a Serb, allegedly participated in the mistreatment and killing of both
Bosnian Muslims and Croats within the Omarska Camp where numerous rapes
and other incidents of sexual violence occurred.52 Although Tadic was not specif-
ically convicted of rape, the tribunal’s opinion went to great lengths to note the
sexual violence that occurred at the Omarska Camp. The decision stated that
women held in the camp were routinely called out at night and raped.
Furthermore, Tadic was found guilty of crimes against humanity (under count 11
of the indictment) because the attacks were carried out as part of a systematic
campaign against a civilian population intended for discriminatory purposes to
inflict severe damage to the victims’ physical safety and human dignity.53 Tadic
was sentenced to 25 years in prison, less time served. Although the Tadic decision
did not directly involve an indictment on rape or sexual violence, the crimes
against humanity were an important part of the trial chamber’s reasoning.54 Future
cases heard by the ICTY would more directly confront the charges of mass rape
and other sexual violence toward women.
Later, the ICTY took up the case of Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija where
Furundzija was a commander of a special unit of military police known as the
“Jokers.” While the Tadic case represents a small step forward in the prosecution
of wartime rape, Furundzija signals an unfortunate reversion to past practice.
This case may well have wide-ranging and negative implications for the prosecu-
tion of sexual violence. During an interrogation, a soldier under Furundzija’s
command raped and beat a detainee.55 The case was based on the testimony of
one person, Witness A, who had been sexually assaulted and raped in the pres-
ence of Furundzija. The defense attacked the memory of Witness A, producing a
memory expert, Elizabeth Loftus, who contends that all memory is flawed and
susceptible to influence, the more so following traumatic events.56 After the com-
pletion of the trial in June 1998, the Office of the Prosecutor [OTP] notified
defense council of a redacted certificate and witness statement (from a psycholo-
gist) obtained in 1995 concerning Witness A and the counseling she received at a
therapy center. The defense filed a motion to strike the testimony of Witness A
even though OTP gave the defense timely notice that Witness A received counsel-
ing for rape trauma syndrome, thus implying that defense counsel could have dis-
covered the psychologist’s certificate during its own investigation.57 Nonetheless,
the trial chamber ruled that the non-disclosure of this evidence constituted “seri-
ous misconduct” and ordered that the trial be reopened. 
Additionally, the defense was permitted to recall any witness to address the
counseling received by Witness A and could offer any new evidence addressing
these issues. Askin explains:
this extremely broad order invades the victim’s privacy, allowing
access to all medical, psychiatric and psychological records, regard-
less of any relevance these records may have to memory or the trial
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testimony . . .. The wording of the order raised grave concerns not
only over violations of privacy, but also over the possibility that
traumatic events in general, and receiving counseling and/or treat-
ment in particular, may put testimony of survivors in jeopardy by
undermining the credibility of their recollection of the event in
question.58
This development is especially troublesome in the prosecution of rape, where the
victim suffers a very personal, traumatic event. In such cases, where counseling
is a normal and necessary part of recovery from the trauma of rape, the fact that
the very recollection of the events in question automatically will be disputed dur-
ing a trial means the victims of sexual assault may be left with the choice of either
seeking counselling or seeking to have their attackers brought to justice. 
Despite the legal manoeuvring and the dangers posed by the trial cham-
ber’s order regarding the memory of Witness A, Ando Furundzija was found
guilty on 10 December 1998 and sentenced to 10 years in prison. In its judgment
the chamber noted that “even when a person is suffering from PTSD [post-trau-
matic stress disorder], this does not mean that he or she is necessarily inaccurate
in the evidence given. There is no reason why a person with PTSD cannot be a
perfectly reliable witness.”59 In the final analysis, the trial chamber showed some
sensitivity to gender-based crimes and the special problems that exist in such
prosecutions. It is significant that Furundzija was found guilty based on the testi-
mony of only one female witness.
One case stemming from the events in the former Yugoslavia that received
widespread attention from international legal scholars is Prosecutor v. Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic [hereafter Kunarac] which dealt
with mass rape and other sexual violence in and around the village of Foca.
Kunarac is important because it was the first ICTY trial predicated exclusively on
charges of sexual violence. The trouble began in April 1992, when Serb forces
took the village of Foca and the surrounding area. They attacked the Muslim pop-
ulation, then expelled them from the area, with many women, children, and older
men taken to detention centers.60 The Muslim women and girls were detained in
a sports complex and a local school where they were subjected to nearly constant
rapes and sexual assaults. In the indictment, the three defendants were charged
with:
1. rape as a crime against humanity (article 5 of the ICTY statute);
2. rape as a war crime (article 3); 
3. “rape as torture” as a crime against humanity (article 5); 
4. “rape as torture” as a violation of the laws of war (article 3); 
5. enslavement as a crime against humanity (article 5); and
6. outrages upon personal dignity (article 3).61
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Given the specificity of these charges and their focus on crimes of sexual assault,
the Kunarac charges signify another step forward in concern for women’s rights
reminiscent of the Tadic case and regain some ground lost in Furundzija.
On 22 February 2001, the trial chamber announced its guilty verdict in the
Kunarac case. The defendants were convicted of war crimes and crimes against
humanity under articles 3 and 5 of the ICTY statute.62 Presiding Judge Florence
Mumba noted that the actions of the three defendants constituted a “nightmarish
scheme of sexual exploitation” which was “especially repugnant,” and that the
three had “thrived in the dark atmosphere of the dehumanization of those believed
to be enemies.”63 Judge Mumba’s distinct references to the horrific, inhumane
actions of the mass rapists focus on the impact of the crimes on a society-wide
scale. As a result, in Kunarac, rape was deemed a crime against humanity as part
of a larger policy to terrorize Muslims, to evict them from a geographical area,
and to convert the region into a Serb territory. 
Crimes against humanity are defined as acts against a population and con-
tain elements of persecutions on political, racial, or religious grounds. In such a
frame of reference, crimes committed against women on the basis of sex are con-
spicuously absent. The defendants in Kunarac were also convicted of war crimes
involving sexual violence. However, under the provisions of the laws of war, the
offense must occur in the context of an armed conflict and there must be a close
nexus between the rapes or other sexual violence and the armed conflict.64 At
issue here is the very status of women within the patriarchal hierarchy. The
important point to note in the Kunarac decision is that rape alone, a crime perpe-
trated against women as women, is insufficient to constitute a crime against
humanity. When crimes against women hold a distinctly subordinate status to
crimes against humanity, women are doubly victimized, doubly dehumanized.
Initially, they suffer the horrors of wartime rape and its accompanying psycholog-
ical trauma, then they suffer through the subsequent trauma of the trial during
which their rights and well-being are not safeguarded as vigorously as the rights
of those criminals responsible for their victimization. 
CONCLUSIONS
Through our investigation, we find that the international approach to pros-
ecuting rape as a crime against humanity or a war crime, as embodied by the
ICTY, provides some modest protections to the victims, just as the legal reforms
in US rape law mitigated some of the secondary trauma of the legal proceedings.
The decisions in the cases discussed above provide evidence that the internation-
al community condemns mass rape, when used as a means of genocide and eth-
nic cleansing. Some of the ICTY decisions set precedents for future prosecutions
of gender-based crime by the international community: rape is more precisely
defined, the rules of evidence and procedure show some sensitivity to the plight
of the victims of these types of physical assaults, and rape has been shown to be
an element of genocide. Yet problems remain.
The international community is loath to admit that sexual violence against
women during armed conflict is largely ignored. The initial reluctance of the tri-
bunal to address such violence, despite the incredible brutality of the rapes in the
former Yugoslavia, underscores this phenomenon. Without heavy pressure from
women’s rights and human rights non-governmental organizations, it is quite
plausible that the international community would continue to neglect the issue of
sexual violence, as it did in previous military conflicts. Given the incredible bru-
tality of the mass rapes in the former Yugoslavia, the reluctance is disturbing.
When cases of mass rape are given proper attention and the perpetrators
are brought to trial, the victimized women can expect a new round of psycholog-
ical trauma in the process. While the initial crime is astoundingly horrific, women
raped in wartime suffer further harm when the judicial system privileges the
rights of the defendant, particularly when that privilege means undermining the
state of the victim’s mental health. For example, the trial chamber’s decision in
Furundzija to re-open the case is an appalling precedent. Although the result was
“right,” there is essentially no protection for the victim. As in American law, the
need to preserve the defendant’s right to undermine the victim’s credibility (and
thus the case against him) outweighed consideration for the victim. Anyone expe-
riencing similar trauma will need counseling, but that may reduce the credibility
of her testimony mainly because such victims are likely to appear unreliable.
There are also potential problems if victims learn how to survive a rape through
passivity, as some of the accounts suggest they did.  Although the rules do not
allow consent as a defense if the victim has reason to fear violence, the legal def-
inition of that threshold for violence continues to reflect a masculinist perspec-
tive.
The prevailing legal conventions are dysfunctional in prosecuting rape,
both domestically and internationally, because they were designed to manage
crimes committed by men against men.  The progress made in prosecuting perpe-
trators of sexual violence does not suggest an increase in respect for women’s
human rights. In former Yugoslavia, the key element that made rape worthy of
serious legal attention was its genocidal purpose. Had the rapes assumed a ran-
dom, rather than systematic character, and had they not been used as a means of
ethnic cleansing, it is doubtful they would have received the solicitous attention
of the ICTY. 
Recent prisoner abuse scandals connected to the war on terrorism illustrate
the continued relevance of our analysis regarding the failure to identify the com-
mon causality of wartime and peacetime rape. The rituals of sexualized violence
in fraternity and sports settings, as described by Sanday, closely parallel the
descriptions of abuse perpetrated by groups of soldiers. Unlike the coverage of
wartime rapes or the unsympathetic dismissal of female victims of gang rapes in
peacetime settings, the accounts of prisoner abuse illustrate the peculiarly gen-
dered role of sex with particular clarity – primarily because the gender roles are
deliberately reversed.  In the Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandals, the victims
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were male. They were abused and humiliated by being stripped of their power and
masculinity through forced nudity, beatings, and simulations of homosexual
activity.  The Abu Ghraib abuses provide an especially powerful illustration of the
role of sexualized violence in establishing the dominance of the guards over their
prisoners.  The soldiers perpetrated and documented the ultimate humiliation of
their prisoners, captured in the famous photograph of Lynndie England holding a
naked prisoner on a leash.  Not only were the prisoners being dominated, but they
were being dominated by women.  Another photograph depicted a simulation of
oral sex between prisoners, placing the man who appeared to perform oral sex in
the position of the female.  News and scholarly analysis emphasized the cultural
significance of the abuse, noting that it was particularly cruel because it attacked
the prisoners’ sense of masculinity and equated them to women.65 The humiliation
was more powerful because of the profoundly patriarchal traditions prevalent in
the region.  The abuses merited attention for three reasons: they happened to men,
women were among the perpetrators, and the abuses assumed a cultural signifi-
cance in light of the religious and ethnic characteristics of the victims.  
At Abu Ghraib, the expected gender equation was reversed and no one, not
even momentarily, entertained the notion that the prisoners consented to the activ-
ities or that the actions depicted might not constitute torture.  Furthermore, no one
required the victims to testify at the court martial proceedings against the abusers.
Clear differences exist in the treatment of the female victims of rape and these
male victims at Abu Ghraib: in the former, the victim’s gender disempowers her;
in the latter, the victim’s gender empowers him. During rape trials, whether or not
the women consented to the activity is questioned; the male victims’ absence of
consent is understood, because his consent to assume the feminine role is incon-
ceivable. In rape trials, women are required to testify in the proceedings; the men
at Abu Ghraib were not forced to revisit their humiliation. The core issue is that
the men are injured mainly because they are demasculinized, which undermines
the foundation of patriarchy. Given the profound media attention paid to the Abu
Ghraib scandal, it seemingly constitutes a worse harm than rape of a woman’s
body. 
Any meaningful attempt to address sexual violence against women
requires a fundamental reconsideration of the legal principles at work.  The norms
that function in managing the crimes that men commit against men cannot be
applied effectively to gendered crimes, except in those rare situations in which the
victims are also heterosexual men.  Because the line between sex and rape is
blurred, in both domestic and international legal discourses, everything depends
upon the interpretation of the particular set of events and the perceptions and
credibility of the parties.  Thus, by privileging the perspective of the accused, the
law gives the victim little recourse.  Convictions occurred in the aftermath of the
former Yugoslavian conflicts not because of the injury to women, but rather
because the rapes were perpetrated with a clearly ethnic intent and on an unusu-
ally massive scale.  As it stands, the law can cope with crimes that constitute man-
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ifestations of racial or ethnic hatred, but not with those that primarily express
patriarchal attitudes that are accepted as normal.
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